How the "Guizhou Choice" of the Post-90s and Post-00s 90 Years Ago Changed China

Guizhou Red Ribbon (Long March Digital Technology Art Museum) ignites the spark at the Sacred Flame Square

(Excerpt from Mao Zedong's "Recalling Qin'e: Lou Mountain Pass")

This famous poem was written by Mao Zedong after the victory at Lou Mountain Pass during the Long March in February 1935. The "cangshan" (blue mountains) in the poem refer to the Dalou Mountains, the boundary between the Guizhou Plateau and the Sichuan Basin. Lou Mountain Pass, known as the "first strategic barrier in northern Guizhou," sits atop the main ridge of the Dalou Mountains. Since ancient times, it has been a crucial gateway on the Sichuan-Guizhou trade route, with its karst landscape earning it the description "like a sea."

Guizhou was the province where the Red Army spent the longest time and covered the widest area during the Long March. After the Central Red Army began the Long March in December 1934, it moved into Guizhou. The Red Sixth Army Corps, the Central Red Army, and the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps successively passed through Guizhou over a span of more than two years, traversing nine cities (prefectures) and over 60 counties (cities, districts).

Ninety years ago, most of those who wrote the legend of a youthful China in Guizhou's breathtaking landscapes were young people born after the 1890s—these "post-90s" and "post-00s" of a special era experienced many life-and-death moments during the Long March, an unprecedented feat in history. They continually made the right choices, altering the fate of the nation and countless individuals.

Guizhou Red Ribbon employs modern technology to make the Long March "within reach."

Today, in Guizhou, you see world-class landscapes like the Chishui Danxia, the Southern Karst, and the perilous Wujiang River. Nearly 90 years ago, these mountains and rivers witnessed the heroic era of "the rugged pass like walls of iron" and the birth of difficult yet historic decisions—Why go to Guizhou? Should we cross the Wujiang River? How to cross the Chishui River four times? If you were transported back to that moment, what would you choose?

In Guizhou, these difficult yet correct decisions...

It is well known that the Zunyi Meeting was a critical turning point in the history of the Communist Party of China and the Red Army. But in fact, the Red Army made many other pivotal decisions on this land that propelled history forward, and their experiences may have been even more remarkable than imagined.

In 1936, the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps fought the Wumeng Mountains Maneuver here.

First, let’s look at the overall strategic layout: The Long March was not undertaken by a single force. At the time, four main Red Army units participated—the Central Red Army, the Red Second Front Army (temporarily formed by merging the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps), the Red Fourth Front Army, and the Red 25th Army—each following different routes.

During the Long March in Guizhou, the Red Army's "post-80s," "post-90s," and "post-00s" fought valiantly on this red soil, honing their skills. Examples include Zhu De (post-80s) of the Central Red Army, He Long (post-90s) of the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps, and Xiao Ke (post-00s).

Even before the Central Red Army began the Long March, the Red Sixth Army Corps had already started its westward campaign. It later joined forces with the Red Third Army in Muzhi, eastern Guizhou, after which the Red Third Army resumed its designation as the Red Second Army Corps. The Red Second and Sixth Army Corps then advanced into western Hunan to divert enemy forces and support the Central Red Army's Long March.

The original plan was for the Central Red Army to head north to western Hunan and join the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps. However, due to the "Left" deviation's strategy of "corridor cover" and a "great relocation"-style breakout—carrying heavy machinery and cumbersome supplies—daily progress was severely limited. By then, Chiang Kai-shek had fully discerned the Red Army's route and set up four defensive lines along the way. After the Central Red Army broke through the fourth line, its forces were reduced by nearly two-thirds, from 86,000 at the start of the Long March to just over 30,000 after the bloody Battle of the Xiang River.

The Liping Conference Site Memorial Museum in Liping County

What to do next? Should they continue to fight head-on against an enemy force five or six times their size, or take a detour?

At the time, Wang Jialie, a warlord of the Tongzi faction, was in charge of Guizhou's military and political affairs. However, internal strife within the Tongzi faction meant he only controlled part of Guizhou's forces. His conflicts with Chiang Kai-shek also led to half-hearted efforts, greatly weakening their ability to block the Red Army's entry into Guizhou.

At an emergency meeting in Tongdao, Hunan, Mao Zedong proposed changing course—abandoning the march to western Hunan and turning west into Guizhou instead. This suggestion gained widespread support.

The upturned-eave buildings in Liping County are products of cultural fusion.

Liping County was the first stop for the Central Red Army in Guizhou. Located at the junction of Guizhou, Hunan, and Guangxi, Liping served as a bridgehead for Guizhou's eastward expansion into Hunan and Hubei and its southward advance into Guangdong and Guangxi. It is also home to the more tourist-familiar Zhaoxing Dong Village. Due to its strategic location, Liping's Qiao Street had already become a bustling marketplace during the Ming and Qing dynasties. Many traveling merchants brought Hui-style architecture here, giving rise to today's "upturned-eave buildings."

The Liping Conference on December 18, 1934, was held in a Huizhou-style building originally belonging to the Hu family. The conference affirmed Mao Zedong's correct proposal to advance into Guizhou and abandoned the plan to join forces with the Red Second and Red Sixth Army Groups in western Hunan.

Figure 1: The Liping Conference made a life-or-death decision in the former Hu family residence.

Figure 2: The "Decision of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on Strategic Policy" made after the Liping Conference.

At that time, the Red Army urgently needed to establish a new base area and hold a formal meeting to clarify the direction of the Long March. Zunyi, located on the border of Sichuan and Guizhou, was strategically advantageous due to its maneuverability and weak defensive forces. Therefore, the meeting proposed that the new base area should be in the Sichuan-Guizhou border region, and under unfavorable conditions, they should move to the northwest of Zunyi.

Thus began the long-standing connection between the Red Army and Guizhou.

After the Liping Conference, the Central Red Army entered the heart of Guizhou and the southern bank of the Wu River. The Wu River, the largest river in Guizhou, has rapid currents and is flanked by high mountains or steep slopes, forming a natural north-south barrier in Guizhou, historically known as the "Natural Barrier of the Wu River." Wang Jialie deployed troops to guard the Wu River, burned civilian houses and boats along the river, and advised Chiang Kai-shek, "We can surely achieve the effect of annihilating them on the southern bank."

Would the Red Army break through the natural barrier of the Wu River or continue fighting on its southern bank?

The Houchang Conference was held at this critical juncture, lasting from the night of December 31, 1934, to the early hours of the next day, becoming a cross-year meeting in the history of our Party and army.

The Houchang Conference: The Eve of the Great Turning Point

Why did it take so long? Because opinions differed. Li De and Bo Gu still believed they should not cross the Wu River and should instead join forces with the Red Second and Red Sixth Army Groups. However, behind the Central Red Army, two columns of the Nationalist forces had already pursued them to the southeast areas of Shibing, Huangping, Zhenyuan, and Sandu, while the Guangxi warlords had also sent an army to the southern areas of Duyun and Dushan. Turning back to western Hunan would have been extremely risky. Under the insistence of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and others, the meeting once again rejected the proposal to go to western Hunan and reaffirmed the strategic goal of crossing the Wu River and advancing into northern Guizhou. It can be said that this meeting made the most direct preparations for the convening of the Zunyi Conference.

How Remarkable Was the Zunyi Conference?

Zunyi, bordered by the Wu River to the south and Lou Mountain Pass to the north, was a distribution hub and transit station for Sichuan and Guizhou, historically serving as an economic, political, cultural, and transportation center in northern Guizhou, highlighting its strategic importance.

The Zunyi Conference was held in the meeting room on the eastern side of the second floor of a gray-and-white, Sino-Western-style two-story brick-and-wood building. Under the wartime conditions at the time, the conference was naturally held in secret, and identifying its location after the founding of the PRC proved challenging. Based on recollections of locals who had participated in Red Army activities and corroborating documents, it took four years to confirm that the Zunyi Conference was held in the house of Bai Huizhang, a division commander of the Guizhou Army—now the small building located on Ziyin Road in Honghuagang District, Zunyi City. In 1958, when Deng Xiaoping returned to the conference room, he immediately pointed to a corner and said, "I sat right there."

The Zunyi Conference, hailed as the "Great Turning Point," lasted three days (January 15–17, 1935) and aimed to summarize the lessons from the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaign and the Long March, focusing on resolving military strategy and organizational issues.

The small building of the Zunyi Conference site in heavy snow.

"How Magical Guizhou Kicks Off Its Winter Travel Mode."

This conference was not as "friendly" as the public might imagine—it was, in fact, intense. One particularly remarkable moment was the "counter-report." What was a "counter-report"? Because Mao Zedong directly opposed Bo Gu's claim that the failure of the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression Campaign was due to objective reasons, arguing instead that it was caused by subjective errors: adventurism in offense, conservatism in defense, escapism in retreat, and desperate recklessness.

Even Zhu De, known for his humility and steadiness, sternly criticized the errors of the provisional central leadership, saying, "If such leadership continues, we cannot follow any further."

After three days of heated debate, the participants largely reached a consensus. The conference established Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership position in the Party Central Committee and the Red Army, marking the beginning of the correct Marxist line represented by Mao Zedong in the Party's leadership. It also initiated the formation of the Party's first-generation central leadership collective with Mao Zedong at its core, ushering in a new stage where the Party independently resolved practical issues of the Chinese revolution. This saved the Party, the Red Army, and the Chinese revolution at the most critical moment.

If the century-old locust tree near the Zunyi Conference site witnessed its pivotal moments, then a lantern in Gouba Village, Zunyi, also bore witness to another decision that changed the fate of the Red Army.

After the Zunyi Conference, the Central Red Army achieved successive victories at Lou Mountain Pass and in the Zunyi Campaign. Naturally, the enemy could not sit idle and urgently dispatched multiple forces to attack Zunyi again while strengthening defenses along the Wujiang River to prevent the Red Army from joining forces with the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps in western Hunan.

Plaque at the Gouba Conference site, telegraph machine

An urgent telegram triggered an emergency meeting. This telegram, sent by Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen, was lengthy and detailed, with its core message proposing an attack on Daguxinchang (present-day Jinsha County, Bijie City, Guizhou Province). On March 10, 1935, the Gouba Conference was hastily convened in a traditional northern Guizhou farmhouse courtyard to debate whether to attack Daguxinchang.

At the time, Daguxinchang was strategically located, bustling with merchants, and ranked first among the four major market towns. Lin and Nie suggested attacking it primarily because it was defended by only two "double-gun" regiments of the Guizhou Army (one hand holding a rifle, the other an opium pipe), which had never defeated the Red Army in previous engagements. This gave the Red Army both equipment and psychological advantages. Capturing the town would lay the groundwork for advancing into western Guizhou and establishing a new base.

The traditional northern Guizhou farmhouse courtyard where the Gouba Conference was held

After this analysis, nearly everyone agreed. However, Mao Zedong, sensing the situation was not so optimistic, opposed the attack. Most still insisted on it, leading to heated debate without consensus. The meeting lasted from morning until late at night. Initially, Mao had three votes of support, but later only one. Ultimately, the decision was made to attack, with Zhou Enlai drafting the next day's battle plan.

After the meeting, Mao, unable to sleep, felt the attack was unwise. He immediately put on his coat, took a lantern, and walked alone along the rural paths of northern Guizhou to Zhou Enlai's residence, telling him: "No, it's too risky."

This was the path Mao once took to discuss the situation with Zhou Enlai

On one hand, the Red Army was exhausted from heavy losses. Daguxinchang, an ancient town with a moat and fortifications, was easy to defend but hard to attack. Nearby, a Guizhou Army division was stationed. On the other hand, the Red Army was isolated: to the northwest of Daguxinchang, the Nationalist Central Army was at Lubanchang and Tanchang; to the southwest, Yunnan Army forces were in Bijie; to the south, the Nationalist Central Army was at Daoba Shui in Zunyi County; to the southeast, Sichuan Army troops had occupied Zunyi; and the Nationalist Central Army and Sichuan Army had advanced to Songkan and Tongzi. If the battle became protracted, the Red Army would face encirclement and annihilation.

After persuading Zhou Enlai, the two went to Zhu De's residence and convinced him as well. The next day, another meeting was held, and under their insistence, the eager commanders finally agreed to abandon the attack plan.

During this time, the Red Army intercepted enemy telegrams confirming Mao's prediction: enemy forces were rapidly converging on Daguxinchang, intending to encircle and annihilate the Red Army. This decision averted a major impending disaster.

After this meeting, it became clear that military decisions could no longer be made through large-group discussions. In urgent combat situations, prolonged debates would delay action and hinder the Red Army's flexibility. Thus, the "New Three-Member Group" (a three-person military leadership team) was formed, consisting of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Jiaxiang. This streamlined decision-making, improved efficiency, and prevented excessive concentration of power.

How "brilliant" was the Four Crossings of the Chishui River?

In 1960, Chairman Mao Zedong told Field Marshal Montgomery, one of Britain's greatest military commanders, that the Four Crossings of the Chishui River were his proudest military achievement.

For Montgomery, this might have been hard to fully grasp, as the scale of the Four Crossings—spanning Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou—was relatively small, involving only about 30,000 troops, far less than the three major campaigns. So what made it so brilliant?

The Chishui River, a tributary of the Yangtze's upper reaches, originates in Yunnan and flows east to Tiziyan at the junction of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. The Daluo Mountain Range acts as a watershed between the Chishui and Wujiang Rivers. This unique geography and historical context allowed the Red Army to maneuver flexibly among the three provinces.

During the Red Army's occupation of Zunyi, Chiang Kai-shek, initially unaware of their movements, made no major offensive deployments. By the time of the Zunyi Conference, he had adjusted his "encirclement and suppression" strategy, blockading the Yangtze River and mobilizing warlord forces from Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, and Shaanxi, while concentrating Nationalist Central Army troops to attack the Red Army from all sides.

The dock at Shuitou Town, Xishui County, has long been a vital passage between Sichuan and Guizhou.

On January 27, 1935, the Red Third Corps (left column) and the Red Fifth Corps (central column) engaged pursuing Sichuan Army forces at Qinggang Slope. The Red Army reinforced its positions and repelled frontal attacks, but due to faulty reconnaissance, enemy reinforcements poured in, making it impossible to annihilate them.

The Red Army's Military Commission then decided to abandon the original plan to cross the Yangtze north of the Chishui River and instead cross westward at Shuitou into southern Sichuan. On January 29, the main force of the Central Red Army crossed the Chishui River in three columns near Yuanhou and Shuitou, advancing toward Guling and Xuyong in southern Sichuan.

It can be said that the First Crossing of the Chishui River was a forced move after the defeat in the battle, shifting from an active stance to a proactive defensive measure. However, this also lightened the troops' load, allowing them to focus more on mobile and guerrilla warfare.

After the First Crossing, Chiang Kai-shek ordered a plan to encircle the Red Army at the junction of Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan, declaring the annihilation of the Red Army "hinged on this move." How could the Red Army prevent Chiang from guessing their intentions? Only by making their own intentions unpredictable even to themselves.

Thus, Mao Zedong made a startling decision—to turn eastward, cross the Chishui River a second time, and fight again at Zunyi. This was not impulsive; it was because their current path was obstructed. After summarizing the lessons from the Tucheng battle, they decided to shift to northern Guizhou, where the enemy had previously made mistakes, to concentrate superior forces and seek favorable opportunities.

From February 18 to 21, the Central Red Army crossed the Chishui River a second time at Taipingdu and Erlangtan, re-entering Guizhou. This "highly erratic" maneuver left the enemy's main forces stranded in the Zhaxi area of southern Sichuan. The Red Army then targeted the weaker Guizhou warlord Wang Jialie, capturing Tongzi, seizing the strategic Louguan Pass—the gateway to northern Guizhou—and taking Zunyi. It was after the Louguan Pass battle that Mao Zedong wrote his famous poem "Recalling Qin’e: Louguan Pass."

A large suspension bridge—the Changkong Bridge—was built across Louguan Pass.

From Zunyi and Maotai, they entered Gulin in southern Sichuan again.

The Red Army's frequent victories left Chiang Kai-shek deeply dissatisfied. He shifted from a "defensive stance" before the Zunyi campaign to a strategy of "pursuit, blockade, and interception," frantically pressuring local warlords, believing this was the "perfect opportunity" to annihilate the Central Red Army.

As enemy encirclement tightened, the "New Three-Person Group" decided to move the Central Red Army from the Changganshan area southwestward to secure a crossing point on the upper Chishui River. Though they faced enemy resistance, the Red Army avoided prolonged engagements, maneuvering flexibly. When they advanced toward Renhuai and Maotai, the Kuomintang magistrate of Renhuai fled, allowing the Red Army to take the town without a fight. They then occupied Maotai Town, 10 kilometers from Renhuai, where they cut bamboo to build rafts for crossing the Chishui River into southern Sichuan again.

The Maotai Ferry and Red Army Bridge in Maotai Town.

Upon hearing the news, locals helped the Red Army build pontoon bridges, some even dismantling their own doors to assist. Soon, three pontoon bridges were erected at the Zhushabao Ferry on the Chishui River, as well as at Shanyang'ao upstream and Yintan Ferry downstream.

From March 16 to 17, the Red Army crossed the Chishui River a third time at three ferries in Maotai Town, re-entering southern Sichuan. Though not yet fully breaking the enemy's "encirclement and suppression," they were no longer moving passively—they had already planned the Fourth Crossing. To escape the siege, they needed to lure the well-equipped Yunnan Army away from the Yunnan-Guizhou border, then pass through Yunnan to cross the Jinsha River. Thus, the Red Army feigned a northward move toward the Yangtze River while preparing to cross eastward back to Guizhou at any moment.

From March 21 to 22, the Red Army crossed the Chishui River a fourth time at Erlangtan and Taipingdu, while pretending to attack Guiyang to draw the Yunnan Army into rushing to its defense. When the Central Red Army turned toward Zunyi and the north bank of the Wu River, Chiang Kai-shek even flew to Guiyang to "supervise the battle," attempting to "annihilate the fleeing bandits."

To further conceal their intentions and confuse the enemy, the Central Military Commission left the Ninth Army Corps on the north bank of the Wu River to mimic the main force in a "game of hide-and-seek," making the enemy believe the Red Army might attack Zunyi again from the east.

After the Fourth Crossing, the Red Army left over 500,000 Kuomintang troops chasing them west of the Chishui River and north of the Wu River. They then feinted toward Guiyang, detoured through southwestern Guizhou, skillfully crossed the Jinsha River, threatened Kunming, and finally broke free from the Kuomintang encirclement.

This series of maneuvers turned the Red Army's passivity into initiative, with far-reaching consequences.

Experiencing the Long March at Tucheng Town, Xishui County.

What did these ordinary people's decisions change?

While the earlier key meetings and the Four Crossings of the Chishui River were largely shaped by leaders' major decisions, countless unnamed soldiers and ordinary civilians also faced critical choices at the time.

Revolutionary Martyrs and Heroic Figures of Guizhou Province (Partial).

Kuniu Mountain, located southwest of Chuan’anba in Shiqian County, Guizhou, resembles a maze. Its southern, western, and northern sides are surrounded by the Heitan River, with sheer cliffs on all three sides.

In October 1934, during the breakout battle of the Red Army's Sixth Corps at Shiqian, the Red Fifty-Second Regiment covered the main forces by blocking the enemy. When the enemy used civilians as human shields, the Red Army soldiers chose to collectively leap off a cliff to protect the people.

This was a decision made by ordinary soldiers—saving the lives of civilians while fulfilling the strategic mission of scouting the path for the Central Red Army's strategic transfer, enabling the main forces to break through.

In 1935, after the Central Red Army crossed the Chishui River four times, as Nationalist forces concentrated east of Guiyang, leaving Yunnan vulnerable, the Red Army split into two routes advancing westward. Among them, the Red Third Corps needed to pass through the Liuma area of Zhenning County, Guizhou, cross the Beipan River, and move into Yunnan.

How to swiftly advance and seize the opportunity? Gaining the trust of local influential figures was the answer.

The "Anti-Chiang Combat Agreement" was signed in this very house.

Zhenning Mountain lies at a strategic point along the Yunnan-Guizhou corridor, a multi-ethnic region. Plagued by conflicts between Yunnan and Guizhou warlords, local armed groups gradually formed around leaders like Lu Ruiguang and Wang Zhongfang. Lu Ruiguang commanded a force of several hundred armed men.

Under the command of Peng Dehuai and Yang Shangkun, the Red Army won the trust of local ethnic minorities and their leader Lu Ruiguang through actions. On April 16, Lu personally welcomed the Red Army into Nongran and signed the "Anti-Chiang Combat Agreement" with them. This marked the first political alliance between the Red Army and ethnic minorities.

Site where the "Anti-Chiang Combat Agreement" was signed.

Lu Ruiguang transformed from a local ethnic armed leader into a revolutionary, securing the Red Army's swift crossing of the Beipan River, advance toward Kunming, and crossing of the Jinsha River. Later, he was arrested and executed at Bajiaoyan, Guiyang, at just 36 years old, due to this agreement.

Want to revisit the Long March? "Red Ribbon" fulfills your wish.

On September 27, the "Red Ribbon" Long March Digital Technology Art Museum, located near Longdongbao International Airport in Guizhou's Shuanglong Airport Economic Zone, will officially open.

It is not a traditional museum or exhibition hall but the first immersive digital experience center themed on the Long March. Instead of exhibits, visitors encounter LED screens. The venue consists of two parts: the immersive digital performance "Red Ribbon: The Great Journey" and the "Red Ribbon: Colorful Flight" experience hall, designed by the visual effects team behind the Beijing Winter Olympics opening ceremony.

The exterior of "Red Ribbon" is highly futuristic.

Visitors can see holographic projections of Red Army soldiers, immersive multi-dimensional displays, and recreations of key Long March scenes enhanced by mechanical motion seats.

"Red Ribbon: The Great Journey" is divided into six chapters: "Unknown Heroes," "Baptism by Fire," "The Great Turn," "The Arduous Journey," "Monument to Victory," and "The New Long March of the New Era," allowing audiences to vividly experience the choices made by the post-90s and post-00s generations of that time.

"Red Ribbon: Colorful Flight" offers a theme-park-like experience, using LED domes, immersive sound systems, and ride equipment to "fly" over Guizhou's landscapes.

"Red Ribbon: One-Minute Teaser"

"Red Ribbon" showcases Guizhou's revolutionary culture through Chinese technological aesthetics, making it more accessible and reminding younger generations that the Long March is not as distant as it seems.

Today, atop Lou Mountain Pass, visitors can see the "endless mountains like the sea, the setting sun like blood" described in poetry, as well as the winding Sichuan-Guizhou Highway. But knowing the stories of this land adds a deeper perspective to the view.

Header image | Guizhou Provincial Party Committee Propaganda Department

Cover Image | Publicity Department of Guizhou Provincial Committee

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